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INTRODUCTION
The debate on the role of law, governance, and religion is not
new; it has been a continuing conflict throughout history. 1 An
exchange between James Madison and Bishop Thomas Bradbury
Chandler, around the time of the United States’ founding, clearly
focuses secular versus sectarian poles that have developed this issue.
Bishop Chandler wrote:
An established religion, is a religion which the civil authority
engages, not only to protect, but to support; and a religion that is
not provided for by the civil authority, but which is left to
provide for itself, or to subsist on the provision it has already
made, can be no more than a tolerated religion.2

Bishop Chandler wanted to see an established, and therefore
government-supported state religious practice.
In his reply, James Madison stated simply that:
[T]he existing character, distinguished as it is by its religious
features, and the lapse of time now more than 50 years since the
legal support of Religion was withdrawn sufficiently prove that
[religion] does not need the support of Government, and it will
scarcely be contended that Government has suffered by the
exemption of Religion from its cognizance, or its pecuniary aid.3
* As of the publication of this note, Christopher Pioch achieved his J.D. from Fordham
University School of Law in 2016 and is also a 2012 graduate of Fordham University with a
B.A. in Anthropology. All thanks and credit goes to Professor Martin Flaherty for his valuable
advice and mentorship throughout this note writing process, as well as to the editors and staff
from Volume XXXVIII and XXXIX of the Fordham International Law Journal. I would also
like to congratulate the new editors of the ILJ’s volume XL who inevitably did work on the
piece as part of their training.
1
. See, e.g., The Enlightenment, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/event/Enlightenment-European-history (accessed Mar. 12, 2016) (discussing the changing
nature of God and philosophy on the worldview of Europe and European Governance);
Thomas Bradbury Chandler, A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans on the Subject
of Political Confusions in which the Necessary Consequences of Violently Opposing the King’s
Troops Are Fairly Stated (1774) Evans TCP (arguing whether religion was still necessary in
society to maintain order).
2 . See Bill Fortenberry, What Freedom of Religion?, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
PROJECT (last accessed March 13, 2016), http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/currentevents/what-freedom-of-religion (discussing the grounds for Free Expression); see also
Bradbury Chandler, supra note 1 (maintaining the argument that the need from religion in
society maintained the natural order).
3. See Fortenberry, supra note 2 (interpreting the original concept of the Freedom of
Religion through the medium of the Federalist Papers); see also JAMES MADISON, THE
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This exchange between Madison and Bishop Chandler begins
the discussion of this Comment on the movements toward an
emerging theory on post-secular governing.4 The term “post-secular”
describes a wide range of theories aiming to describe a phenomenon
of increasing religious influence and awareness on society and its
governing structures.5 In the United States, post-secular governance
began with the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) in 1993, which has spawned an increasing number of
judicial opinions seeking to determine the interplay between religion
and government.6 Ireland, in contrast, began as a sectarian state by
relying heavily on Catholic social programs, which has had the effect
of also promoting Catholic prejudices on topics such as abortion and
contraception; Ireland has faced the recurring issue of divorcing its
government from much of the Catholic influences deeply ingrained in
Irish society.7
Part I of this Comment examines recent historical developments
on the shifting perspectives on free exercise of religion in both the
United States and in Ireland.8 Part II examines the social conflicts in

WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Gillard Hunt ed., 1910) (advocating that the government not
take a position on established religion).
4. See infra Parts II and III (dissecting the intricacies of interpretations on religious
freedom). Part II.A shows how the United States moves from secular thought to permitting
religious arguments. Part II.B discusses the drift away from national, borderline established,
religion.
5. See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Tony Blair, & Regis Debray, Secularism’s Crisis of
Faith, http://www.staff.amu.edu.pl/~ewa/Habermas,%20Notes%20on%20Post-Secular%20So
ciety.pdf (describing the influence of religion and how it has morphed into a largely personal
experience, and describing how those experiences tend to affect or influence our society); see
also Trevor Owens Jones, What is Post-Secular?, N.Y. PUB. LIBR. (Dec. 21, 2010) (accessed
Oct. 2, 2015) (defining post-secularism as a drift from imperial secularism, and defining
imperial secularism as viewing the world with religious neutrality).
6. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. ___ (2014); compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___
(2015) with Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, IRISH TIMES (May 22, 2015),
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/marriage-referendum (ensconcing marriage equality
into Irish Law through popular referendum).
7. See Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (granting Free Exercise); see also Corway v.
Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485 (Ir.) (identifying a shift away from a specific statute).
8. This Comment makes references throughout to free exercise. This specifically refers
to the free exercise of religion in both the United States and Ireland. Both countries’
constitutions contain provisions for the freedom of religion. The United States Constitution
specifically calls this the “free exercise of religion,” while the Irish Constitution refers to it as
the “free profession and practice of religion.” Throughout this Comment, I use the term “free
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each country on issues such as business, education, the family, and
personal objections to how others live their lives that have led to a
common shift in ideology towards post-secular governance.9 Part III
then presents a conclusion on how the two governments are coming to
similar post-secular conclusions despite their different constitutional
language.
I. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
In the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court looked
secularly upon the rights of citizens, finding that private rights of
individuals were inherently found within Constitutional
“penumbras.”10 Across the Atlantic, the Irish Supreme Court relied on
the 1962 Encyclical of Pope John the XXIII to find that “many
personal rights of each citizen follow from the Christian and
democratic nature of the state.” 11 Using conflicting methods of
interpretation, both countries nonetheless came to similar conclusion
that certain private rights of individuals were protected from state
involvement. .12
Since the 1990s, differences between the Supreme Court and the
legislature as to the extent and manner of the government’s obligation
exercise” interchangeably for both constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also
Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44
9 . See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. (2014); Obergefell, 576 U.S.;
Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (granting Free Exercise); Corway v. Ind News Ltd. [1999]
4 IR 485 (Ir.); Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, supra note 6 (ensconcing marriage equality
into Irish Law through popular referendum).
10 . See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (noting that the First
Amendment had penumbras geared towards privacy rights); see also Paul W. Butler & David
L. Gregory, A Not So Distant Mirror: Federalism and the Role of Natural Law in the United
States, the Republic of Ireland, and the European Community, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
429, 454 (1992) (comparing the “natural law” as it is interpreted in the United States and in
Ireland. While the United States found secular reasoning sufficient to discover the “natural
law,” Ireland relied upon religious dogma. The Article further examined the issues of Personal
Autonomy, Abortion, Marriage Equality, and Divorce); Douglas Laycock, Church and State in
the United States: Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 501, 511 (2006) (laying out the religious-secular argument and the Left-Right conflict
encountered in the Modern United States in easy to understand language).
11. Ryan v. Att’y Gen. [1965] IR 294 (Ir.) (creating two types of Constitutional rights
in Ireland), see also JOHN PAUL XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS (1962) (stating the governance of the
State as being different from the laws of God).
12. Compare Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (granting private rights to citizens) with Ryan
v. Att’y General [1965] IR 294 (Ir.) (granting private rights to citizens).
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to honor and review religious free exercise claims have allowed
conflicts, such as those surrounding women’s healthcare, to develop
in the United States.13 Part I.A details the primary nexus for these
changes. Conversely, in Ireland, religion has been described as being
“inseparably bound up with the nation’s traditions, history, and
culture” and holds a special place in society.14 This relationship has
bred a different interpretation of free exercise. 15 Part I.B seeks to
illustrate the Irish government’s gradual march away from the Church
influences in government while also moving towards a post-secular
style of governance.16
A. Free Exercise and the United States’ Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
The 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA” or “the
Act”), has had a tremendous impact on United States Free Exercise
cases. 17 The Act is the culmination of three Supreme Court cases
spanning nearly thirty years. 18 The first of these cases, Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), involved a plaintiff (Ms. Sherbert)

13. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, 575 U.S.; Obergefell, 576 U.S.; Eternal Word T.V.
Network v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2014); Priests For
Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cert. granted
sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444, 193 (2015)
and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446,
193 (2015)).
14 . See Siobhan Mullally & Darren O’Donovan, Religion in Ireland’s ‘Public
Squares’: Education and the Family and Expanding Equality Claims, PUB. L. 284, 284-86
(2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1649012 (citing the special place
of the Catholic Church in Irish government); see also Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44
(discussing the free exercise of religion).
15. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14; Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44.
(commenting on the borderline establishment of Catholicism in government).
16. See infra. Part 1.B (discussing how the Irish government initially included the
special place of the Catholic Church in their Constitution and in their social welfare programs
has gradually divested itself of the need for Catholic sponsored assistance and has come to
broadly separate the interests of Church and State.
17 . Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (discussing
requirements for the court in determining whether a practice has violated religious freedoms)
18 . See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (stating strict scrutiny
requirements); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (discussing substantiality
requirements); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (discussing the definition of
“compelling”).
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who had become a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.19
Two years after her conversion, the Plaintiff’s employer implemented
a six-day work week and tried to put her on a Saturday schedule. The
Sabbath Ms. Sherbert celebrated, however, was on Saturdays, so she
sought an exemption from working. 20 The employer fired Ms.
Sherbert because she could not work on Saturdays, and she was
subsequently denied unemployment benefits by the state for turning
down a viable job opportunity.21
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion states that the right of
religious exercise is a fundamental constitutional right, and as such, it
must be strictly scrutinized by the Court to see whether the
government has any compelling interest that would justify an
infringement of religious practice. 22 An alternative test Justice
Brennan considered was whether any proposed legal bar to free
exercise had a “rational relationship” to an existing state interest.23
This test, useful in other situations of constitutional analysis, was
immediately discarded by Justice Brennan because it did not
adequately protect the notion of free exercise. 24 After these
considerations, the Court established the three prongs of the Sherbert
Test by asking whether the government placed a burden on the
individual’s free exercise of religion. If the answer is yes, then the
government must apply a strict scrutiny analysis by asking the second
prong of whether there is a compelling reason for this burden on free
exercise. The government must then continue with the third prong of

19. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (creating the initial test); see also Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (utilizing the Sherbert test).
20. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at n.1.
21. Id.
22. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (stating the need for a compelling interest and a
narrowly tailored law in Free Exercise cases); see also United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that there needs to be a narrower scope when reviewing
legislation appears to specifically violate the Constitution. This test is referred to as “strict
scrutiny”).
23. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (requiring both a compelling state interest and a
narrow interpretation on the law); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(instituting a test of rational relationship).
24. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (requiring both a compelling state interest and a
narrow interpretation on the law). Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) with Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (outlining two of the bases for the Supreme Court’s analysis
for Constitutional rights questions: rational relationship to a state interest (Lochner) and
strictly scrutinizing something that infringes on a fundamental right (Caroline Products)).
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determining whether the imposition is narrowly tailored so as to limit
the burden.25
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972), the Court
addressed a proposed statute that would require all children to receive
secondary school education.26 The Amish traditionally removed their
children from school after eighth grade due to both practical and
religious reasons. 27 This clash resulted in a challenge to the new
statute.28
The Court was ultimately forced to distinguish the difference
between a religious practice — which would enjoy constitutional
protection — from what is simply considered to be a way of life.29
The Court acknowledged that while both are important to citizens, the
United States Constitution only protects Free Exercise of religion.30
The facts of Yoder were exceptionally important because the Amish
lifestyle is directly tied to their religion, making it nearly impossible
to separate the two.31 By analyzing what would specifically constitute
a religious practice the court was able to determine the elements
necessary to show how religious practice mandates a moral or
lifestyle disposition as opposed to a moral or lifestyle disposition
unsupported by religious practice.32
For just under twenty years, the Court decided Free Exercise
claims using the Sherbert and Yoder tests, implementing strict
scrutiny and looking for demonstrable evidence as to the substantial

25. Compare Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398, 406 (1963) (creating the initial test) with
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (utilizing the Sherbert test).
26 . Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (detailing substantiality
requirements for religious practice).
27. See generally id.
28. See generally id.
29. See id. at 216 (stating that “if the Amish asserted their claims because of their
subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the
majority . . . their claims would not rest on a religious basis”).
30. See U.S. CONST amend. I (granting a Constitutional protection to the exercise of
religion); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (noting that Religious Exercise is protected, and
that sometimes a way of life is extracted from religion, but also noting religious practice and
lifestyle are decidedly different things).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
32. See generally Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217-19 (noting that a substantial religious belief
that influences the community’s lifestyle or moral practice can be demonstrated through
empirical evidence); see, e.g., Brandt v. Burwell, 43 F.Supp.3d 462 (2014) (detailing the use of
an Encyclical to prove religious belief).
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belief of the affected religious practice. 33 Employment Division v.
Smith altered the governmental requirement of justifying burdens on
religious exercise and was the primary reason for the creation of
RFRA.34 In Smith, the Court attempted to define what constitutes a
compelling interest in Free Exercise claims, and asked whether there
should be any limitations to determining a compelling interest.35
Smith involved a Native American plaintiff using peyote in
religious practice, which resulted in the denial of unemployment
benefits.36 The Court held that a religiously neutral law may burden
religious practice without violating the spirit of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.37 The Court justified the limitation
on free exercise by noting that any true compelling interest analysis
would only become muddled in inter-religious conflicts and therefore
serve only to cause anarchy in society.38
As a direct response to EEOC v. Smith, the United States
Congress passed RFRA in 1993.39 RFRA provided that laws designed
to be “neutral” towards religion may nonetheless risk burdening
religious exercise.40 RFRA was Congress’ means of overturning the
Supreme Court through the legislative process by declaring that the
“compelling interest test” previously set forth by the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), would be strictly adhered to and applied in all cases
33. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (using strict scrutiny); see also
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228-29 (defining substantial belief).
34. See Employment Div. Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-85
(1990) (ruling that religiously neutral laws, as in laws that do not otherwise mention religious
practice, don’t necessarily violate the Free Exercise Clause.); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-85.
36. Id. at 874.
37. Id. at 881-85.
38. See id. (placing much added emphasis on the anarchical nature of examining all
religious differences under a blanket compelling interest requirement).
39. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); see also 42
U.S. Code Chapter 21B Religious Freedom Restoration, LEGAL INFO. INST.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-21B (stating that Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except where a burdening religious exercise is (1) in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest. This has given rise to a three-prong test: (1) whether
religious exercise is substantially burdened, (2) there is a compelling state interest being
furthered, and (3) that the least restrictive means is being used to further the compelling
interest).
40. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)
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where the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened, without
exception.41
Congress defined what constitutes a “religious belief” by
specifically referring back to both Yoder and Sherbert. 42 The first
challenge to RFRA came in 1997 when the Supreme Court held that
the Act exceeded Congress’ power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 The Court reasoned that RFRA was too broad of an
intrusion into the traditional realm of the states to govern and regulate
for the health and welfare of their residents in certain situations.44
Three years later, however, Congress passed the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).45 RLUIPA provides:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation
in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.46
41. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring demonstration of
such a compelling interest and narrow tailoring in all Free Exercise cases where a religious
person was substantially burdened by a law) with Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (stating that the
adoption of a true compelling interest test would lead to anarchy).
42. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (stating that a
government shall not “substantially burden” the exercise of religion); see, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (examining how to consider a proposed substantial belief).
43. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508-09 (1997) (stating that the RFRA
alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause in a way that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not permit).
44. See id. (relaying that the Bishop in the region sought to expand his Church grounds.
Local zoning laws prohibited this, and thus the Bishop filed suit stating that this law
substantially burdened the free exercise of Religion. The holding in this case meant there were
limitations on the RFRA but only with regard to zoning); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (examining the notion that there should be a dialogue between people in the
United States created by the Free Exercise Clause, but that the State has a duty to remain
outside of this dialogue).
45. See The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2014) (stating that Churches and other Religious institutions could avoid otherwise
burdensome zoning laws. RLUIPA is hereinafter included in all references to the RFRA
because it took the one aspect of the RFRA deemed unconstitutional and found a
Constitutional basis to enforce it); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb (2012) (stating the original language of the RFRA).
46. See The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2012) (reiterating the language of the RFRA); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (for the RFRA’s original language).
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According to RLUIPA, even where the land use is one of general
acceptance, such as a zoning law, a religious burden can still be
placed upon the individual. 47 The passage of RLUIPA once again
overturned the Supreme Court on the issue of religious freedom by
having the effect of restoring RFRA to full potency.48
The attention and care that must be taken regarding matters of
religion, along with the clear disagreement on the interpretation of
free exercise between the Legislative and Judicial branches, continues
to keep the United States from being able to consistently and
completely separate a person’s religious views from laws meant to
benefit society as a whole. 49 Justices must now be more open to
religious discussion, which also explains why disputes grounded in
religious reasoning are attracting much more attention in the courts.50
The attention given to these claims by courts and the media indicates
a sensitivity towards the religious argument, and the judiciary’s need
to analyze the substantiality of religion-based arguments in order to
determine if they fall in the purview of protected acts.51

47. See The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2012) (finding an alternative basis, the Commerce Clause, to permit the exact same
protections of the RFRA); see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-14 (discussing the basis of
the authority for the original RFRA as too broad).
48. See The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2012); see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-14.
49. See The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2012); see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-14.
50 . See Robert Barnes, The Justices Beliefs Affect How Others Approach Them,
MOMENT (Jan. 2015), http://www.momentmag.com/symposium-religion-supreme-court/
(examining the notion that people tailor arguments with a Justice’s beliefs in mind); see also
Lyle Deniston, The Justices’ Values are Influenced by Religion, MOMENT (Jan. 2015),
http://www.momentmag.com/symposium-religion-supreme-court/ (examining the notion that
religious influence is not so separable from a Justice’s decision making).
51. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (supporting the notion that there
should be a dialogue between people in the United States by the Free Exercise Clause, but that
the State has a duty to remain outside of this dialogue); see also Steve Bennen, Kim Davis
Finds a New Home in the GOP, THEMADDOWBLOG (Sept. 28, 2015, 10:40 AM),
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/kim-davis-finds-new-home-the-gop (noting the
idea that that religion and religious morality help shape the political beliefs of certain people in
the United States).

2016]

ONE NATION UNDER GOD(S)

1401

B. Historical Background of Religious Freedom in Ireland
In Ireland, religion has always been important to the identity of
the people. 52 Bunreacht na hEireann, the Constitution of Ireland,
initially recognized certain enumerated religious practices,
specifically:
The State recognize[d] the special position of the Holy Catholic
Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith
professed by the great majority of the citizens.
The State
also recognize[d] the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church
in Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society
of Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the
other religious denominations existing in Ireland at the date of
the coming into operation of this Constitution.53

The Catholic Church enjoyed great deference by the government
given its “special place” for nearly forty years before the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution Act removed the above clause from
the Irish Constitution in 1972.54 This may have been due, in part, to
Ireland’s preparation to sign the Treaty of Accession in 1973, which
allowed Ireland to join the European Union.55 Around this same time,
52. See
generally
Religion
and
Society,
ASK
ABOUT
IR.,
http://www.askaboutireland.ie/reading-room/history-heritage/pages-in-history/Ireland%20in%
201904/religion-and-society/ (describing the heavy role religion and subsequent religious
social services played in the development of the Irish nation); see also J.R. Walsh, Religion:
The Irish Experience (Nov. 30, 1999) http://www.catholicireland.net/religion-the-irishexperience/ (describing a surveying method by which modern Irish people experience or do
not experience faith, in contrast to the traditional notion of the role of the Church in the
nation).
53. See Fifth Amendment to the Constitution Act 1972 (SI 5/1972) (Ir.)
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1972/en/act/cam/0005/sec0001.html#sec1;
see
also
Constitution of Ireland - Bunreacht na hÉireann, ROINN AN TAOISIGH, DEP’T OF THE
TAOISEACH,
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Information/The_Constitution/
(outlining the particulars of the Amendment). Ireland has two official languages, English and
Irish. The Irish Constitution is written in both languages. For a distinction between the Irish
Constitution and the United States Constitution, I use the Irish name for the Irish Constitution
throughout the body of the Comment, however I cite to the Constitution using the English
citation for ease of understanding.
54. See Fifth Amendment to the Constitution Act 1972 (SI 5/1972) (Ir.)
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1972/en/act/cam/0005/sec0001.html#sec1.
COMM’N
(Mar.
22,
2016)
55. See
Ireland
in
the
EU,
EUR.
http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/ireland_in_the_eu/index1_en.htm (looking at Ireland’s attempts to
enter the Union.); see also Treaty Concerning the Accession of Denmark, Ireland, the
Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 27,
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the Irish courts’ reasoning was also influenced by increasing social
pressures to change laws and policies regarding the State’s
conservative religious values.56
The first challenge to Bunreacht na hEireann came in the 1964
matter of Ryan v. Attorney General. 57 While not a religious issue,
Ryan established a rights-based analysis that has become pertinent in
examining religious exercise claims.58 At the time, the complainant
sued the government for adding fluoride to the water supply, stating it
should be her right to decide whether she wants to drink water with
fluoride in it or not. 59 The Supreme Court held that Bunreacht na
hEireann grants two types of rights: the private rights given to the
individual, and the public rights of the State to care for its people.60
The decision by the state to add fluoride to the water supply did not
affect the private right of the family to be reared according to how
Ms. Ryan saw fit, but it also did not impose an affirmative duty for
the Irish Government to remove fluoride from water sources.61
It is with this idea of the distinction between private and public
rights in mind that the Court of McGee v. Attorney General discussed
the limitations of a criminal law barring access to contraceptives in
1974.62 The Court examined whether Mrs. McGee, a married woman
with four children, should have the ability to access contraceptives
solely on the basis of an asserted need to preserve her health.63 The
1972 O.J. L 73/15, at 5 (outlining the provisions the countries would adopt in entering the
European Union).
56 . See infra Part II.B (discussing specifics on methods employed by the Irish
government when religious freedom is at issue); see also Timothy J. White, Catholicism and
Nationalism in Ireland: From Fusion in the 19th Century to Separation in the 21st Century,
4(1) WESTMINSTER PAPERS IN COMMC’N & CULTURE 47, 47-64 (2007)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273381464_Catholicism_and_Nationalism_in_Irelan
d_From_Fusion_in_the_19th_Century_to_Separation_in_the_21st_Century (discussing the
history of secularization in Ireland).
57. Ryan v. Att’y Gen. [1965] IR 294 (Ir.) (creating two types of Constitutional rights
inherent in the Bunreacht).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. McGee v. Att’y Gen. [1974] IR 284 (Ir.).
63. See id. (Mrs. McGee had four children already with her husband and was advised
by a doctor that becoming pregnant again would severely jeopardize her life. Her doctor
prescribed a spermicidal lubricant and use of a diaphragm. The right to access these was
subsequently barred by the state for its Catholic influenced ban of contraceptives).
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Irish Supreme Court ruled that, under Bunreacht na hEireann, marital
privacy is considered to be one of the private rights granted protection
and therefore the nature of permitting a married couple to use
contraceptives was an issue of private morality to be determined
between the husband and wife.64 The Court reasoned that while God
was the source of all authority, humans have different religious
denominations that help to formulate different beliefs and views on
morality; this consequently has an effect on areas such as
procreation.65
Even after these events, religious influence on the State still
remains an important part of Irish identity.66 Bunreacht na hEireann
continues to provide that “[t]he State acknowledge that the homage of
public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in
reverence, and shall respect and honour religion . . . [but shall be]
subject to public order and morality.” 67 Religion has been, and in
some regards continues to be intrinsic to the identity of the Republic
of Ireland.68
For example, it was not until 1996 that the Irish Government
amended Bunreacht na hEireann to permit married couples to
divorce. 69 The ban on divorce had been a “direct product of the
Catholic Church’s strong political influence in Ireland, [and
demonstrated] the role of the Catholic Church in the cultural identity
of the Irish State.”70 In 2009, the Irish government became a party to
64. Id.
65. See Paul W. Butler & David L. Gregory, supra note 10; see also McGee v. Att’y
Gen. [1974] IR 284 (Ir.) (recognizing that the personal right to marital privacy in the home
superseded the public religious right).
1937
art.
44,
66. See
Constitution
of
Ireland
https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Bhunreacht_na_hEireann_web.pdf.
67. See id.
68. See TIM P. COOGAN, IRELAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 709 (2003) (discussing
the development of the Irish Nation); see generally Butler and Gregory, supra note 65
(discussing Ireland’s religious background).
69. See Jackson N. Maogoto & Helena A. Anolak, Legalising Divorce in the Republic
of Ireland: A Canonical Harness to the Legal Liberation of the Right to Marriage Among the
Disenfranchised, L. & RELIGION EJOURNAL (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465343 (arguing
that the disenfranchisement of religion has effected the identity on the Irish People); see also
Ronan Keane, Reflections on the Irish Constitution, 5-7 RADHARC 147 (2004-2006)
(discussing the evolution of Bunreacht na hEireann).
70. See Maogoto & Anolak, supra note 70 (discussing the influence of Catholicism);
see generally Maurice Curtis, The Splendid Cause: The Catholic Action Movement in Ireland.
(2008) (discussing the Catholic actions in politics in Ireland).
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the European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon, subject to the condition that
“nothing in that treaty would affect the protections afforded to the
rights to life, family, and education in the Irish Constitution.”71 This
vehemence for religious protections inherent in those rights shape the
religious discourse in Ireland.72
II. PRESENT STATUS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
GOVERNMENT
Both the United States and Ireland have constitutional provisions
granting religious protection. 73 Each country developed differing
understandings as to the extent of this protection.74 Part II.A discusses
the extent of free exercise afforded to corporations and other large
organizations in the United States. Part II.B discusses arguments
against the idea of extending free exercise to these United States
corporations, paying attention to the area of employment and civil
rights law. Part II.C analyzes the popular discussion on religious free
exercise claims by individuals in the United States. 75 This is
contrasted by the Irish understanding on religious free exercise
discussed in Part II.D. Part II.E discusses the involvement of the
European Community in evoking change on conservative religiousbased policies in Ireland. Part II.F describes how Ireland is able to
avoid many of the problems the United States faces through its
constitutional language and an understanding that religious ideologies
are inherently private and should be given voice only where there is
an overwhelming opinion on the morality of the issue.76
71. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 284-86 (discussing the importance of
these Catholic values); see also TREATY OF LISBON AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2007/C 306/01)
(discussing Ireland’s agreement to subject itself to the Human Rights standards of the
European Union with reservations on certain areas).
72. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 284-86 (discussing the evolution of
the Catholic State); see also Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (granting the Free Exercise to
worship as one sees fit subject to the conditions of public order and morality).
73. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I with Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (noting the
free exercise of religion clauses in each).
74. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (emphasizing the difference between US
absolute Freedom versus Ireland’s Freedom subject to Public Order and Morality).
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting free exercise); see also Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (extending free exercise to corporations).
76. See Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44; see also Same-Sex Marriage Referendum,
supra note 6 (ensconcing marriage equality into Irish Law through popular referendum).
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A. Religious Freedom in the United States
The United States broadly guarantees the free exercise of
religion. 77 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014), extended the protection of religious expression to include
closely held corporations.78 As a result, corporations use this religious
freedom to object to supplying certain benefits to its employees due to
a deeply-held religious belief. 79 The Court stated that while the
Affordable Care Act mandates preventive care and screening for
women, a religious exemption can exist.80 The Court then determined
that the Dictionary Act treats corporations as people under RFRA,
which ultimately creates a conflict between the corporation’s religious
interests and the employees’ health, religious, and employment
interests.81
The Court uses the standards set forth in RFRA to assess the
validity of a corporation’s assertion of a religious belief.82 The Court
must first determine if the religious belief being infringed upon is a
substantial one; second, determine whether the state’s interest in
restricting the exercise is compelling; and third, ensure that the
government’s actions are the least restrictive means to accomplishing
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb (2012) (protecting rights of religious expression and exercise).
78. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (stating that a closely
held corporation is a person under the Dictionary Act, which permits these corporations to not
be burdened for their substantially held beliefs); see also infra Part II (examining decisions in
the Circuit Courts that expand this notion on Free Exercise under the RFRA).
79. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (stating that the opinion
looked only at where the exercise of religion should be burdened under the RFRA, not whether
corporations, specifically, should be burdened); see also Hobby Lobby Case: Court Curbs
Contraception Mandate, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/28093756
(stating the rule from Hobby Lobby and potential future issues).
80. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2762 (describing the fact that unless an
entity fits into an exemption, the Affordable Care Act mandates the entity supply contraceptive
coverage for women); see also Hobby Lobby Case: Court Curbs Contraception Mandate,
BBC NEWS (June 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/28093756 (stating mandate for
contraceptive coverage and describing the views of conservative religious leaders as one of the
most significant victories for religious freedom in America).
81. The Court stated that there is a very difficult question regarding an act that “has the
effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.” See Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778; see also Words Denoting Number, Gender, and So Forth, 1 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2012) (stating that corporations are considered people for purposes of the laws of the
United States).
82. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (discussing the
three prongs); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (defining substantial belief).
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that state interest. 83 This test applies traditional strict scrutiny to
determine the strength of the governmental interest with one notable
exception: while the test contains both a requirement of substantiality
as to the proffered belief and a requirement that any subsequent
infringement on that belief places the least restrictive means on the
religious practice, the courts cannot first frame the issue by asking
whether or not the law has been narrowly tailored to that issue.84
The government must give quantifiable cost-based estimates of
the particular measure, then compare those costs with the level of
restriction to religious liberty. 85 Because neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court has yet to define its parameters, 86 this has had farreaching implications on the United States Circuit Courts as they are
left to interpret when the government violates the least restrictive
means test.87
83. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (stating that the
RFRA ensures that any intrusion into Religious Liberty is the least restrictive means afforded
by government); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. (stating that filing for an
exemption may in fact be the least restrictive means in this case, thereby exempting the
corporation from having to provide care and allowing employees to receive the same care from
the government).
84. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (stating that the
RFRA ensures that any intrusion into Religious Liberty is the least restrictive means afforded
by government); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. (showing that the government
is not using the least restrictive means, and that the belief being restricted is substantial to the
faith through empirical data, and that proof of that substantiality would constitute an absolute
defense to the State action).
85. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (stating that, first, there must be a
compelling state interest and, second, the government must show that it is furthering that
interest through the least restrictive means, even where the costs of accomplishing those means
are not necessarily the least expensive for the government); see also David Post, What’s
Wrong With the Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. POST, (July 9, 2014) (posing the essential
question of how a corporation can express any means of religious belief when it does not
express the qualities of people who practice that religious belief).
86. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (stating that “[The Department of
Health and Human Services] itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that
is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their
religious beliefs.”). But see Tom Howell Jr., Obama Admin’s attempt to follow Supreme
Court’s Birth Control Ruling Pleases Few, WASH. TIMES (July 15, 2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/10/obama-skirts-supreme-court-birth-controlruling/?page=all (stating that, subsequent to some of the proceeding cases, President Obama
issued an Executive Order changing the requirement for organizations with religious
objections to healthcare to afford them the opportunity to voice their conscientious objection,
which serves to give the government the notice that Form 700 previously did).
87. The eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals hear cases from the United States Federal
District Court(s) of each state. Each Circuit Court is in charge of a different geographic area of
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In Eternal Word T.V. Network v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services (‟EWTN”), 756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. Ala. 2014) the
concurring judges stated that even minimal participation in an act that
substantially violates a firmly-held religious belief was not allowed
under RFRA’s least restrictive means test.88 In EWTN, the minimal
participation involved was filing a form (Form 700) notifying the
government that the organization would not cover contraceptives for
its employees.89 Upon receipt of the form, the government would then
have a third party appointed to administer those same health benefits
contested by the company.90 This was contrary to dicta in the Hobby
Lobby opinion, which noted that the notice requirement of Form 700
did not necessarily violate the least restrictive means of governmental
intrusion.91
Judge Pryor’s concurrence in EWTN stressed that the
government already exempted eligible organizations, who themselves
may not have filed Form 700, from the healthcare law. 92 The
government’s definition of an eligible organization is “a non-profit
organization that holds itself out as religious and opposes some or all

the country. See Geographic Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United
States District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/
CircuitMap.pdf.
88. See Eternal Word TV Network, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. HHS, 756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.
2014) (Pryor, J., concurring); cf. Howell, supra note 87 (stating that, as of July 2015, President
Obama required organizations declaring a religious exemption to write a letter to the
Department of Health and Human Services stating what their beliefs were and why they will
not cover contraception. This places the government on notice in a way that prevents
corporations from filing an objectionable form).
89. See Eternal Word TV Network, Inc, 756 F.3d at 1339 (stating that filing Form 700
required the corporation to turn a blind eye to the violation of their religious beliefs). Cf.
Howell, supra note 87 (filing conscientious objector letter would seemingly serve to fulfill
Judge Pryor’s fears)..
90. See Eternal Word TV Network, Inc, 756 F.3d at 1339; see also Thomas Reese,
Supreme Court: Accommodation, Yes; Form 700, No, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. (July 7, 2014)
(describing the refusal of religiously affiliated organizations to participate in the government
mandated healthcare program by not filing Form 700); see also Howell., supra note 87.
91. Compare Eternal Word TV Network, Inc., 756 F.3d at 1339 (stating any method of
allowing the government to supply the healthcare violates this belief and therefore the least
restrictive means is to not supply it) with Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80
(stating that filing the Form would not necessarily violate the least restrictive means analysis).
92. See Eternal Word TV Network, Inc., 756 F.3d at 1342. But see Howell, supra note
87 (looking at the fact that President Obama changed the Form 700 requirement to that of a
conscientious objector letter).
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of the coverage based on religious exemptions.”93 Judge Pryor failed
to adhere to the plain meaning of the exception, which grants a
religious exemption only to non-profit religious organizations and
does not mention any exemption for for-profit corporations.94
Judge Pryor’s interpretation of the Hobby Lobby analysis can
easily be contrasted with the Fifth Circuit ruling in McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar, 756 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 2014). 95 In
McAllen, plaintiffs sued the government for the right to possess eagle
feathers for use during religious ceremonies.96 The existing law stated
that the government may issue permits to members of recognized
Native American tribes who are believers in the tribal religious
practices.97 The Court then examined two of the three RFRA prongs
by requiring that the government action “(1) advance a compelling
government interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.”98 The Court first held that there is a compelling interest
in protecting the bald and golden eagle as United States national
symbols; second, it held that despite this interest, there is no reason to

93. See Eternal Word TV Network, Inc., 756 F.3d at 1342. But see Howell, supra note
87.
94. Id.
95 . Compare Eternal Word TV Network, Inc., 756 F.3d at 1342 (finding a least
restrictive means has been violated by filing Form 700) with McAllen Grace Brethren Church
v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter McAllen] (declining to examine whether
a substantial wait time of six months to three and one half years to acquire ceremonial objects
was the least restrictive means).
96. See McAllen, 764 F.3d at 469 (stating plaintiffs were practitioners of a Native
American religion that used eagle feathers in its services); see also Bald and Golden Eagles, 16
U.S.C. § 668 (2012) (stating that Bald and Golden Eagles are protected creatures, and the only
people permitted to possess Eagle feathers were members of Native American tribes, for use in
their ritual practices).
97. See McAllen, 764 F.3d at 469; see also Bald and Golden Eagles, 16 U.S.C. 668668c (2012) (stating that Bald and Golden Eagles are protected creatures, and the only people
permitted to possess Eagle feathers were members of Native American tribes, for use in their
ritual practices).
98. See McAllen, 764 F.3d at 469 (relying on the RFRA test); see also Definitions, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (giving the three prongs of the test used in McAllen. The first prong is
that there is a substantially held religious belief, the second prong is that there is a compelling
government interest, and the third prong is that the least restrictive means affecting religion to
further that state interest has been employed. Only then will the action be legal under the
RFRA).
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keep people in non-federally recognized Native American tribes from
possessing bird feathers for use in religious ceremonies.99
In McAllen, the Court made the distinction that while not being
allowed to file the proper forms constitutes a substantial bar to the
free exercise of religion, an extended waiting period to obtain these
parts for religious use might not constitute a substantial impediment
to religion. 100 This illustrates that while a compelling interest was
demonstrated, the most the court was willing to do was allow nonrecognized Native tribes access to the waitlist rather than attempt to
impose a lesser restrictive measure allowing for the timely
distribution of ceremonial feathers. 101 This interpretation of Free
Exercise was more narrowly tailored, and the court avoided the issue
as to whether the way in which the religious items were supplied was
the least restrictive means to facilitate the religious practice.102
The idea of what may constitute a burden on the free exercise of
religion was complicated in Brandt v. Burwell, 43 F.Supp.3d 462
(2014), which dealt with several religious corporations similar to
those in EWTN. 103 The difference is that Brandt involved
organizations falling under the umbrella of Church governance. The
court made its decision, in part, by permitting Ecumenical papers and
a Papal decree to be admitted as evidence of the hundreds of years of
Catholic teaching.104 The Church argued that this historical practice
permits it to infringe upon the liberty of individuals that were
99. See McAllen, 764 F.3d at 473 (citing to the principle of religious freedom); see also
Definitions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (stating that the government shall not infringe upon a
substantially held religious belief).
100. See McAllen, 764 F.3d at 470 (stating that there is a six month waiting list for a
practitioner to receive feathers for their ceremonies and a waiting period of three and one half
years for an entire bird); see also National Eagle Repository, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV..
http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/law/eagle/ (discussing an amendment to the Act
allowing bird parts to be imported) (Mar. 13, 2016).
101. See McAllen, 764 F.3d at 470e (adding these non-recognized tribes to the waiting
list for bird parts); see also National Eagle Repository, supra note 100 (discussing an
amendment to the Act allowing bird parts to be imported).
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
103. Compare Brandt v. Burwell, 43 F.Supp.3d 462 (2014) (examining organizations
run by an Archdiocese who pay into a community trust for health coverage, which is also run
by the archdiocese) with Eternal Word TV Network, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. HHS, 756 F.3d 1339,
1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (involving a private for-profit corporation not affiliated with a diocese).
104. The Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4 consisted of an “Apostolic Letter Issued ‘Motu Proprio’
on the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XVI on the Service of Charity.” See Brandt, 43 F.Supp.3d at
469.
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employees of the Church’s charitable organizations.105 In this case,
the archdiocese directly managed and paid health benefits through a
private trust, and did not utilize a third party insurance company.106
This turned the archdiocese into a healthcare provider for its own
employees, which potentially created a separate issue under the
United States’ Constitution’s Establishment Clause.107 In this context,
it is plausible that filing for a religious healthcare exemption could
not only violate a substantially held religious belief, but also may not
be the least restrictive means for furthering the government interest.108
This is distinguishable from EWTN because Brandt involved a
concrete affiliation between the corporations, non-profit
organizations, and the Catholic Church’s diocese – which directly
governed these organizations – whereas in EWTN, the corporation
holding itself out to be religious and Catholic was a standalone
organization not governed by a diocese.109
The trend of merely allowing any organization to be granted the
same protections as a church was interrupted in November 2014,
when a limitation was placed on the ability for an unaffiliated
religious organization to object to filing the healthcare forms.110 In
105 . Id. (utilizing the Encyclical to show a history of long-standing belief for all
practitioners of Catholicism, and an expectation that people follow the teaching).
106. Compare id. (noting the idea of paying into a private, Church-run trust) with
Eternal Word TV Network, Inc., 756 F.3d at 1342 (utilizing a third party insurance carrier).
107 . U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that the United States will not support an
established religion. The fact that the Church has handled all of their healthcare needs
internally by having its employees pay into and out of a trust fund specifically for Catholicbased healthcare may violate the idea of a separation of Church and State); see also Brandt, 43
F.Supp.3d at 466-67(privately sourcing its coverage).
108 . Compare Brandt, 43 F.Supp.3d at 469 (stating that after hearing testimony,
including Catholic doctrine, a substantial belief was met and the form was not the least
restrictive means of engaging in the government interest) with McAllen Grace Brethren
Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2014) (in which the government declared that
after filing the paperwork, the court need not rule on whether the government was in fact
engaging in the least restrictive means); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (requiring the government to have a compelling reason to infringe on
Free Exercise and to use the least restrictive means to meet that goal).
109 . Compare Brandt, 43 F.Supp.3d at 466-67 (involving organizations that were
governed directly by the Archdiocese) with Eternal Word TV Network, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S.
HHS, 756 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (granting exemptions normally permitted to an
archdiocese to a non-affiliated for-profit corporation).
110. See Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. 772 F.3d 229 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (cert. granted sub nom.); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Burwell,
136 S. Ct. 444, 193 (2015) (cert. granted sub nom.); Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446, 193 (2015) (noting that the filing of conscientious objection
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Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 772 F.3d
229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) the court found that non-profit organizations
affiliated with a religious group are nonetheless required to follow the
regulations for opting out of the Health Care provisions.111 This was a
drastically different ruling from those in other circuits and gives a
minor indication of the government’s ability to estop certain
assertions that the least restrictive means to accomplish the
compelling interest of placing a restriction on a certain religious
practice or group, the final element of the RFRA test, has not been
met.112
B. Arguments Against Corporate Inclusion in United States’ Religious
Rights
Hobby Lobby granted closely held corporations the ability to
exercise the religious rights of their owners as though the corporation
itself was a practitioner of the faith.113 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
Hobby Lobby cites to cases in which the court held that
“accommodations to religious observances . . . must not
significantly impinge on the interests of third parties.” 114 This
understanding of the freedom of religion in the United States
comports with the traditional understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution.115 The dissent argues that the section of
RFRA regarding government actions that “substantially burden a

forms was a de minimus inconvenience for the groups); see also Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (requiring the government use the least restrictive
means to accomplish its interests).
111. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
112. See id.
113. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,2759 (2014) (granting
corporations the power to exercise religious beliefs); see also supra Part II.B (detailing the
instances of corporate exercise of religious belief in various situations across the circuits).
114. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2790 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(understanding Free Exercise in a manner consistent with the Irish understanding of Free
Exercise); see also Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (subjecting free exercise to public order
and morality requirements).
115 . See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2791 (citing Zechariah Chafee,
Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919)) (stating that a person’s
“right to swing [his] arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins”); see also U.S. CONST.
amend I. (stating that Congress shall not pass any law establishing or restricting the Free
Exercise of Religion).
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person’s exercise of religion” should not apply to corporations.116 The
Dictionary Act contains a provision that refers to corporations as
people; however, it controls “only where context does not indicate
otherwise.” 117 This case is contextualized in the traditional role of
religion in a for-profit corporate setting.118
This corporate right to Free Exercise contributes to the friction
between employers—who may be entitled to institute policies based
on their religious beliefs—and Title VII of the American Civil Rights
Act—which protects certain enumerated classes including religious
affiliation—from discrimination in the workplace. 119 The Supreme
Court held that Title VII protections extend to include employment
discrimination as occurring where there has been a reasonable
suspicion of religious intolerance when determining a candidate’s
eligibility to be hired for a job. 120 Future conflict is likely to arise
where a corporate entity exerts a religious belief contrary to the belief
of an employee, 121 or where a person’s lifestyle is contrary to an

116 . See Words Denoting Number, Gender, and So Forth, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)
(including corporations in the definition of persons); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. at 2793 (stating that a corporation does not exercise a religion the way a person does).
117 . See Words Denoting Number, Gender, and So Forth, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)
(declaring corporations be interpreted as people); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
at 2793 (noting that, in this instance, context should indicate otherwise).
118. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2795 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§2000e(b),
2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(a) (2012)) (stating that “Workers who sustain operations of [for-profit]
corporations are commonly not drawn from one religious community. Indeed, by law, no
religion based criterion can restrict the work force of for-profit corporations.”).
119. See Definitions, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2012) (noting that Title VII protects individuals
from discrimination based on their status as a member of a protected class. Protected classes
include: age, sex, race, gender, and religious affiliation); see also Jess Bravin, Supreme Court
Sides With Muslim Abercrombie Job Applicant over Head Scarf, WALL ST. J. l (June 1, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-sides-with-muslim-abercrombie-job-applicantover-head-scarf-1433170999.
120. A headscarf “controversy” has erupted throughout Europe with the influx of many
Muslim individuals into countries like Spain, France, and even Ireland. The controversy
surrounds permitting Muslim women and girls to wear a veil for school and work. Many
jurisdictions have found the hijab acceptable, while more extreme forms of veiling, such as the
niqab or burka, are not permitted. This could be considered the United States’ version of such
a controversy. See Jess Bravin,,supra note 119. See generally ,Hilal Elver, The Headscarf
Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion, FOREIGN AFF. (2012) (advocating for
Muslim women who choose to dress in the “symbols of their faith”).
121. See supra note 120.

2016]

ONE NATION UNDER GOD(S)

1413

employer’s religious belief.122 This effectually incentivizes people to
follow a religious way of life—which seems contrary to the idea of
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and to RFRA.123
Title VII may be considered a valid exception to the RFRA but it
only protects the religious rights of employees who can prove
substantial belief contradictory to that of the employer, not those of
employees with a moral disposition unrelated to religion.124 In EEOC
v. Abercrombie and Fitch, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015), the Court held that
even a suspicion as to the religion of a person, where a religious
accommodation may be requested, violates Title VII.125 This would
have the effect of forcing the court to evaluate, and in some cases to
rule upon, the substantiality of the parties’ beliefs.126
C. Religious Rights of the Individuals Leading to Discussion and
Litigation in the United States
Courts have generally recognized certain limitations to the
RFRA where there are other, more prevalent, interests involved.127 In
122. See id.; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-18(1972) (discussing the
differences between a lifestyle based upon a substantial religious belief from a non-religiously
based lifestyle choice).
123. Compare Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (stating
that government may not intrude on a substantially held religious belief) with Definitions, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (protecting religious beliefs of individuals from employment
discrimination); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
124. Title VII protects against various forms of employment discrimination, including
discrimination based on religious practice. Compare Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (permitting that government may not intrude on a substantially held
religious belief) with Definitions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (protecting the religious beliefs of
individuals from employment discrimination); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-18
(distinguishing between a substantial belief and a lifestyle choice).
125. See E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) (ruling
that Abercrombie violated Title VII in anticipating that a hiring candidate would seek an
exception to the neutral “looks” policy to wear a headscarf); see also Definitions, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (2012) (stating employers shall not discriminate against employees based on religious
grounds).
126. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that a closely held corporation can have a substantial belief);
see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (stating that
government will not substantially infringe on the exercise of religion.); see also Definitions, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (stating employers shall not discriminate against employees based on
religious grounds).
127. See People v. Jackie H. (In the Interest of L.H.), 2014 IL App (1st) 133252-U,
2014 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2014) (discussing the interests of
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re L.H., 2014 IL App (1st) 133252-U (2014), describes a substantial
public interest in protecting children from dangerous situations even
where the dangerous situation is created by the practice of religion.128
Here, the defendant participated in a religious experience called “light
therapy;” this involved a minister praying over the recipient while
laying his hands on the recipient. Eventually, this touching progressed
to the minister removing the recipient’s clothing and ultimately ended
with his hands on the recipient’s genitals.129 The evidence in this case
supported the conclusion that too much involvement in the church
may be harmful to children’s development, and therefore, the court’s
order did not impermissibly infringe on the parental freedom of
religion.130
The more recent cases on Free Exercise involve disputes on
marriage equality. 131 In June 2015, the Supreme Court decided
Obergefell v. Hodges declaring marriage equality in the United States
a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 132 The majority opinion of Obergefell
addressed the religious argument against same-sex marriage on two
points: first, that people have a valid ground from which to voice a
religious objection, and second, that the state should remain outside of
such philosophical debates.133 The Court concluded the legitimacy of
the marriage equality argument by referencing the oft-cited religious
protecting children); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)
(setting forth the requirements to be overcome).
128. See In re L.H., 2014 IL App (1st) 133252-U (2014) (holding that the danger to the
child outweighed the religious practice).
129. See id.
130. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (stating that the government shall use
the least restrictive means to accomplish a compelling interest).
131. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (stating that Free Exercise
permits an appropriate discourse) with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (permitting businesses to decline benefits based on their religious beliefs). These two
cases run the risk of clashing should closely held corporations raise conscientious objections to
extending spousal benefits to married homosexual couples.
132. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597-99 (stating that marriage equality is a right
under our federal government without examining the moral merits); see also U.S. CONST. art.
XIV (requiring the States to comply with these Equal Protection rulings). Compare Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2611-13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that this decision should have been
left to be decided by the people) with Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, supra note 6
(ensconcing marriage equality into Irish Law through popular referendum).
133. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (stating that the State has a duty to protect
its citizens) with John Paul, XXIII, supra note 11 (stating the governance of the State as being
different from the laws of God).
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debates and asserting that the protections of the First Amendment
apply to all people in the United States.134 The role of the state is to
simply grant groups of people the benefit of the rights afforded under
the Equal Protection Clauses.135
The dissenting Justices in Obergefell reasoned that the Court
lacked the proper authority to make a decision of this magnitude and
that the decision should therefore be left to the people through
popular debate, referendum, or through the legislative process. 136
Justice Roberts quoted historical ideas surrounding the development
of marriage, and alluded to the changing public opinion in defining
marriage as reasoning to allow the process to continue without
judicial interference.137 Justice Scalia added that the Court exhibited
great hubris for finding within the Constitution a fundamental right to
same-sex marriage, interfering in the democratic process, and taking
away the debate on marriage from the people of the United States.138
Meanwhile, Justice Thomas’ dissent discussed the notions of liberty
and Due Process as they were historically recognized and how this
decision failed to conform to them.139
After Obergefell, many religiously-affiliated organizations asked
the courts to clarify the extent of rights to be afforded to homosexuals
regardless of religious objections; this ultimately forces the courts to
continue to weigh in on religious matters.140 The climate surrounding
Free Exercise claims post-Hobby Lobby and post-Obergefell, has led

134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (stating that marriage equality is a right under
our federal government without examining the moral merits); see also U.S. CONST. art. XIV
(giving all people across all states Equal Protection under the law).
136. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
this decision should be left to the People) with Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, supra note 6
(stating that Ireland passed same-sex marriage through referendum).
137. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
138. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court
overextends the meaning of Equal Protection for claims that the Court “really likes”).
139. Id. at 2631-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing against the type of substantive due
process rights the Majority employed).
140. See, e.g., Cole v. North Carolina, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112478 (Aug. 3, 2015);
G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99715 (July 29, 2015); Robert v. UPS Inc., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97989 (July 27, 2015); Haas v. S.C. D.M.V., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106415
(Aug. 13, 2015); De Leon v. Abbot, 791 F.3d 619 (2015) (involving the subsequent discourse
on this issue).
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to the current post-secular path in interpreting the understandings of
Free Exercise.141
D. Religious Freedom in Ireland
Bunreacht na hEireann provides a guarantee for a “person’s free
profession and the practice of religion of one’s choice, subject to the
requirements of public order and morality.” 142 At first glance, this
would appear to limit a person in Ireland from fully expressing their
religious beliefs in public.143 Rather than hinder Free Exercise, these
requirements of order and morality are strictly interpreted in order to
actively facilitate religious practices and religious ways of life among
private persons by limiting the ability of one group of individuals to
quash the public practices of another group unless a real harm could
result from the practice.144
In 1999, the Irish Supreme Court decided in Murphy v.
Independent Radio and Television Commission that a prohibition on
religious advertisement was necessary to prevent the potential for
unrest and divisiveness between people, specifically by limiting the
potential for inter-religious strife. 145 The Court applied a
proportionality test to determine the appropriateness of the action and
concluded that the best way to avoid involving the government in

141. See supra notes 131-40 (discussing the litigious environment in which the United
States has found itself).
142. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 287 (discussing the manner in which
people are free to exercise); see also Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (stating the provisions
of the Free Exercise Clause).
143. See supra note 142 (indicating that free exercise is not an absolute right and
recognizing the inherent need to have limitations in place).
144. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 287-88 (stating a general preference
to have a religious presence). Compare Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (granting Free
Exercise of Religion) with People v. Jackie H. (In the Interest of L.H.), 2014 IL App (1st)
133252-U, 2014 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2014) (acknowledging
the idea that limitations on proselytizing displays of religious practice may be necessary to
prevent harm to others).
145 . See Murphy v. Ind. Radio and Television Commission [1999] 1 IR 12 (Ir.)
(discussing the importance of public order and morality in a nation heavily influenced by
religious practice); see also Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 287-89 (discussing the
evolving role of religion in the Irish Nation); Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 IR 531 (Ir.)
(instituting the proportionality test).
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active evaluation of the merits of differing religious beliefs was to
impose a blanket ban on all religious advertisement.146
That same year, Corway v. Independent News narrowed a
person’s ability to sue another based on religious principles. 147 In
Corway, applicant John Corway sued defendants Independent
Newspapers (Ireland) and Aengus Fanning over a cartoon published
in the Irish Independent News after the passage of Ireland’s divorce
referendum.148 The cartoon, depicting a caricature of a plump priest
offering communion in one hand and a chalice in the other while three
politicians turn away and wave, read, “Hello progress - bye bye
Father?”149 Mr. Corway stated he suffered extreme emotional distress
as a result of the disrespect shown to the Church.150
Mr. Corway sought to have defendants convicted under the
Defamation Act of 1961. 151 Bunreacht na hEireann protects Free
Speech, provided that the “publication or utterance is not
blasphemous, [wherein the] matter of the offence shall be punishable
in accordance with [the] law.” 152 The Court, however, came to the
146 . See Murphy v. Ind. Radio and Television Commission [1999] 1 IR 12 (Ir.)
(discussing the importance of maintaining the public order and morality); see also Mullally &
O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 287-89 (discussing the evolving role of religion in the Irish
Nation); Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 IR 531 (instituting the proportionality test).
147. See Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485 (Ir.) (stating that the plaintiff felt
deeply offended by the newspaper’s publication and blasphemous nature against the Church);
see also Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) (Ir.) (instituting revisions to the statutory
crime
of
Blasphemy
post-Corway),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/
en.act.2009.0031.pdf..
148. See Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485 (Ir.) (stating that the Defendant had
blasphemed against all of Catholicism in its cartoon); see also Defamation Act 2009 (Act No.
31/2009) (Ir.) (instituting revisions to the statutory crime of Blasphemy post-Corway),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf.
149. See Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485 (Ir.) (proposing that caricatures of
this nature are clearly an offense against God); see also Defamation Act 2009 (Act No.
31/2009) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf (instituting
revisions to the statutory crime of Blasphemy post-Corway).
150. See Corway v. Ind News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485, 3/10 (Ir.) (stating that the private
offense and ridicule the Plaintiff felt is not in doubt); see also Defamation Act 2009 (Act No.
31/2009) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf.
151. The Defamation Act of 1961 provides, in relevant part, that people who engage in
blasphemy and libel against a religious institution are to be fined and imprisoned.
152. See Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485, 4/10 (Ir.) (declaring the only
definition for blasphemy as of the time of this case came from Murdoch’s Dictionary on Irish
Law (Topaz Publications 1988) which defined blasphemy as the “crime which consists of
indecent and offensive attacks on Christianity, or the Scriptures, or sacred persons or objects
calculated to outrage the feelings of the community. However, the definition does go on to say
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conclusion that while the applicant did communicate his outrage at
what he “perceived to be an insult to the Sacrament of the Eucharist,”
the blasphemy charge was not met.153
Ten years later, the Oireachtas (Ireland’s legislative branch)
clarified the government’s position on blasphemy in the 2009
Defamation Act. 154 This version of the Act created an intentional
mens rea requirement for blasphemy. 155 As a historically religious
people, the change in this blasphemy provision exemplifies how the
recognition of religious claims is important to Ireland’s heritage, but
also how restrictions on religious claims are necessary to “safeguard
the impartiality of the state.”156
In 1999, the Irish demonstrated their ability to consider and
apply Catholic canonical law in the court system rather than utilize
the Irish government’s divorce code during the proceedings of O.B. v.
R. 157 The parties, seeking a divorce, requested that the High Court
apply the Catholic Church’s sacramental definition of marriage rather
that the mere denial of Christian teaching is not sufficient to constitute an offense); see also
Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) (Ir.) (instituting limitations to the Blasphemy
Statutes), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf.
153. See Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 I.R. 485 (Ir.) (stating that the man’s
personal convictions were not in doubt); see also Defamation Act of 2009 (Act No. 31/2009)
(Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf (limiting blasphemy based
on Corway).
154. See
Defamation
Act
2009
(Act
No.
31/2009)
(Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf. The Act provides in relevant
part that a person who is convicted of blasphemy shall be fined up to EU€25,000 for a person
who “publishes or utters matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held
sacred by any religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents
of that religion, and (b) [the person] intends, by the publication or utterance of the matter
concerned, to cause such outrage.”
155. See Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485 10/10 (Ir.) (declaring a mens rea
requirement existed); see also Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) (Ir.) (instituting the
mens
rea
requirement
discussed
in
Corway),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/
pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf.
156. See Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485 10/10 (Ir.) (stating that the jury
must find an intent on the part of the alleged blasphemer); see also Defamation Act 2009 (Act
No.31/2009) (Ir.) (changing the requirements for Blasphemy), http://www.
irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf; see Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14,
at 291 (describing the reasoning of the State).
157. See O.B. v. R. [1999] 62M IR 168 (Ir..) (describing a divorce in which the parties
requested the application of Canon Law). See generally Royal Commission on University
Education in Ireland, 32 Sessional Papers 19 January 1902 through 18 December 1902 (1902)
(indicating the religious bias even in the Royal Academies, which taught the generation of
Judges up to this point).
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than use the civil contractual approach defined in Irish Law.158 The
High Court did not address why the parties did not apply the civil law
when seeking a divorce; it simply opted to apply the Catholic Canon
Law.159
Aside from these instances, the extent of free exercise is
generally resolved on a local level, and occasionally in alternative
dispute tribunals. 160 In 2004, the general position of the Irish was
exemplified in the tribunal case of Sheeran v. Office of Public
Works.161 In Sheeran, an Equality Tribunal expressed that the state
was not obliged to adopt a secular approach but was required to
respect and honor religion. 162 The complainant, an atheist who
objected to the Chapel Royal ringing the Angelus Bells on public
property, argued that the religious use of public property was
158. See Maogoto & Anolak, supra note 70 (detailing the deference to religion); see
also O.B. v. R. [1999] 62M IR 168 (Ir.) (divorcing parties opted to utilize Canon Law when
presenting their cases for divorce. Specifically, they had obtained an annulment and considered
themselves divorced).
159. See Maogoto & Anolak, supra note 70 (describing how the petitioner obtained a
Papal Annulment and subsequently remarried. Nearly twenty years later after realizing that the
annulment did not change her status under Irish Law, the Court declared her second marriage
bigamous, and the petitioner and her ex-husband sought a decree of nullity as opposed to filing
for a divorce); see also O.B. v. R. [1999] 62M IR 168 (Ir.) (utilizing annulment papers to
evidence their divorce).
160 . See generally Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14 (describing the general
reliance on religion); see, e.g., infra xx (discussing the typical way in which the Irish have
dealt with the public and private spheres).
161. See Sheeran v. Office of Public Works dealing with mediation tribunal and as such
has no case reporter; see also Patsy McGarry, Tribunal Rejects Angelus Complaint, IRISH
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2004) (describing why the Angelus Complaint was rejected); see generally
Paul Hopkins, RTE and the Angelus: Daily Bells Still Chime with Me, BELFAST TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 17, 2015) (describing the Angelus Bells and asking why they should be discontinued
even if one doesn’t believe in them), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/debateni/rteand-the-angelus-daily-bells-still-chime-with-me-31342332.html.
162. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 289. Mullally and O’Donovan
acknowledge that while this may be the general mindset of the nation, there are other local
decisions that may conflict with this viewpoint. The authors compare the decision in Sheeran
to that of Garda Siochána, a case in which the Irish Garda refused to allow a Sikh member of
the Garda to wear his turban while on duty. The reasoning was that the prohibition was
necessary to safeguard the impartiality of the police force as an arm of the state. This decision
faces some criticism, however, since the Police Service of Northern Ireland allows its Sikh
members to wear the turban along with their uniform. Pursuant to the 1998 Belfast Agreement,
also known as the Easter Agreement, there must be an “equivalence of rights” between
Northern Ireland and the Republic. Equivalence of rights is particularly applicable in the
religious context given the tensions that occurred between the Catholics and Protestants in
Ireland.
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inappropriate.163 Because this was an issue that did not affect public
morality, the tribunal granted the exercise of religious expression in
the public sphere.164
A brief debate involving the rights of Muslim women to wear
the hijab in certain places was also decided without traditional
litigation.165 The Irish headscarf controversy occurred in 2008 when a
request by a town Board of Education asked for departmental
guidance as to whether a Muslim pupil should be allowed to wear her
hijab as a part of her school uniform.166 Ultimately, the Department of
Education left the decision to the discretion of the local school board
and the student was permitted to wear the hijab.167
Subsequent criticism of the Department of Education’s
lackluster response spurred the Department to issue an official
statement describing how uniform policies were to be determined on a
local level, noting that the policy should not operate as to exclude
pupils of different religious backgrounds from seeking or continuing
their enrollment.168 As with the constitutional provision for freedom
of expression, the statement issued by the Department of Education
suggests that there may be limits on the forms of clothing that may be
acceptable in school, specifically clothing that “obscures facial views
and creates an artificial barrier between pupil and teacher.” 169 The
163. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 289 (examining the complaint Mr.
Sheeran put before the tribunal); see also McGarry, supra note 162. See generally Hopkins,
note 162 (stating the Angelus Bells will continue to ring).
164. See Constitution of Ireland 1937,art. 44 (describing the requirements that religious
expression fits into the public order and morality); see also Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note
14, at 296; McGarry, supra note 162. See generally Hopkins, supra note 162.
165. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 296; see also Jonathan Spollen,
Hijab Sparks Controversy in Ireland, NAT’L (Sept. 20, 2008) (reporting specifics on the
unlikely controversy that has been one of several such issues cropping up in Europe),
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/hijab-sparks-controversy-in-ireland.
166 . See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 296 (discussing the headscarf
controversy); see also Spollen, supra note 166 (reporting specifics on the unlikely
controversy).
167. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 297-98 (detailing the “headscarf
controversy,” if it can be called that); see also Spollen, supra note 166 (reporting specifics on
the unlikely controversy); see also E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2028 (2015) (detailing the US “headscarf controversy”).
168 . See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 297-98 (describing the public
response after the controversy); see also Spollen, supra note 166, (reporting specifics on the
unlikely controversy).
169. See Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (granting religious freedom subject to
public order and morality); Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 297-98 (noting a
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statement elaborates on how local schools should “consult the
communities on the scope of religious freedom, the duty to ensure
effective access to education, and the effectiveness of local
consultation mechanisms.”170 This effectively gives regulatory voice
to article 44 of Bunreacht na hEireann’s public order and morality
clause.171
The Irish government’s active policy of “facilitating religious
ways of life” is reinforced in its requirement that education is to be
given state aid, even where the schools are under the management of
different religious institutions.172 As of the 2006 census, a staggering
ninety-eight percent of children attending primary school in Ireland
attend Catholic or Protestant Schools. 173 This reflects the Irish
people’s historical reliance on religious institutions for the provision
of social services.174 Even in the two percent of schools that are not
expressly affiliated with a religious order, a religious education based
on Christianity is incorporated into the school system, embracing the
belief that “a religious spirit should inform and vivify the whole work
of the school.”175

somewhat similar case in the United Kingdom in which a Muslim teacher was suspended for
wearing a full niqab because it did not allow for optimum communication between teacher and
student). Thus, a distinction is drawn between wearing the hijab and that of wearing the niqab
or burka.
170. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 298-99 (describing the scope of the
controversy); see also Nathalie Rougier & Iseult Honohan, Religion and Education in Ireland:
Growing Diversity, or Losing Faith in the System, 51 COMPARATIVE EDUC. 71, 71-86 (2015)
(describing the extent of religious exercise in school systems).
171. See Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (granting free exercise of religion subject
to the public order and morality); see also Rougier & Honohan, supra note 171.
172. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 291-92 (describing the spirituality
still contained in the Irish system); see also Rougier & Honohan, supra note 171 (describing
religion in the Irish curriculum); Niall Murray, Religion In Schools Opt Out Demand is ‘Very
Low’, IRISH EXAMINER (Mar. 13, 2015) (describing how, despite a drift away from the
Catholic faith, children still learn the Catholic doctrine), http://www.irishexaminer.com
/ireland/religion-in-schools-opt-out-demand-is-very-low-318153.html.
173 . See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 291-92; see also Rougier &
Honohan, supra note 171; Murray, supra note 173.
174. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14 (detailing current trends); see also TIM
P. COOGAN, IRELAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2003) (describing the evolution of the
Irish State and its reliance on the social services that the Church provided).
175. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 291-92 (citing to Department of
Education Curriculum Teacher’s Handbook) (detailing the mandates for teachers to facilitate
spirituality).
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In 2002, the Irish National Teachers Union sought to modify and
update the teaching of religion in schools by officially adopting the
Intercultural Guidelines, which defines intercultural education as
“respecting, celebrating, and recognizing the normality of diversity in
all areas of human life.”176 The government finally recognized that
there must be a “dynamic and two way process of mutual
accommodation by all migrants and residents here in Ireland”
regarding religious practice in schools in 2007, but so far it has only
granted members of minority religions the constitutional right to opt
out of religious instruction.177 Ultimately, this indicates that while the
notion of incorporating the various religious practices of the nonChristian minority into the school system has been received
positively, Christianity remains the religion of the majority and
subsequently the religion in which pupils are educated.178
E. Influences of the European Community
The European Commission on Human Rights (“ECHR”) has
continued to criticize Ireland in other areas for its adherence to certain
religious practices promoting discrimination. 179 Employment
discrimination, for example, is permitted where it will preserve “the
religious ethos” or otherwise “avoid offending religious
sensitivities.”180 As a result, the government uses a test of reasonable
176. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 294 (explaining the Intercultural
guidelines for school systems); see also The National Center for Curriculum and Assessment,
Intercultural Integration in the Primary School (2005) http://www.ncca.ie/uploadedfiles/
Publications/Intercultural.pdf (teaching young people to respect diversity).
177. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 295 (noting the importance of
religion in Irish education); see also Murray, supra note 173 (stating that, despite having the
option to, most families do not opt out of this education).
178. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 295 (noting the majority of family
continue the religious formational education offered in schools). But see Douglas Dalby,
Catholic Church’s Hold on Schools at Issue is Changing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016)
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/world/europe/ireland-catholic-baptism-school.html?_r=0.
179. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 295 (noting the majority of family
continue the religious formational education offered in schools). But see Douglas Dalby,
Catholic Church’s Hold on Schools at Issue is Changing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016)
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/world/europe/ireland-catholic-baptism-school.html?_r=0.
180. Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14. at 292 (describing how Ireland has refused
to remove religion entirely from its governing system); see also Rougier & Honohan, supra
note 171 (respecting religion in the Irish system); Murray, supra note 173 (stating that it was
the choice of the people to continue a religious path in the education system by not opting out
of the religion’s education instruction).
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necessity on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a
discriminatory practice is justified.181
Abortion rights in Ireland are highly charged by religious
advocates as an immoral practice; Irish laws, influenced by the
majority religious opinion, continue to be an area of criticism.182 A, B,
and C v. Ireland was a landmark decision judged by the European
Court which involved three women who traveled to England for
abortions and sued the Irish Republic for failing to assist them in a
manner consistent with their asserted human rights. 183 The Court
found that while Ireland does allow women to travel outside of the
country to receive an abortion, the process of traveling was
psychologically and physically harmful for the women who did so.184
The ECHR previously found an obligation on the part of States to
provide for the physical and psychological integrity of people living
within their borders, something that the Commission determined
Ireland had failed to do.185 As a result of pressures from the ECHR,
Ireland was forced to examine the religiously conservative contexts of
its abortion policy.186
A, B, and C v. Ireland did not, however, eradicate the Catholic
majority influence on Ireland’s abortion practices; this was evidenced
by a 2013 inquest into the death of a woman who was refused a

181. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 293 (describing the propensity test).
Compare Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 IR 531 (Ir.) (describing the Irish Proportionality Test)
with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (instituting a rational relationship to a state
interest). Note how the test established in Heaney mirrors the rational relationship test
expressed in Lochner, not the strict scrutiny of Carolene Products.
182. See A, B, and C. v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R (2010) (the three petitioners
had difficulty obtaining abortions and ultimately came before the European Court of Human
Rights alleging that Ireland’s anti-abortion laws violated their human rights); see also A, B,
and C v. Ireland, IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASS’N, https://www.ifpa.ie/Hot-Topics/
Abortion/ABC-v-Ireland (accessed Oct. 1, 2015) (describing the ruling and subsequent
measures the EU took against Ireland).
183. See supra note 182.
184. See A, B, and C. v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 67 (2010) (describing the
difficulties of the applicants in getting the abortion); see also ABC v. Ireland in Sexuality,
Information Reproductive Health and Rights, IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASS’N,
https://www.ifpa.ie/Hot-Topics/Abortion/ABC-v-Ireland (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (describing
the ruling and subsequent measures the EU took against Ireland).
185 . See A, B, and C. v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 69 (2010) (stating the
importance of protecting the rights of a state’s citizens); see also ABC v. Ireland, supra note
182 (describing the ruling and subsequent measures the EU took against Ireland).
186. Id.
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potentially life-saving abortion.187 Savita Halappanavar, a practitioner
of the Hindu religion, was told that though the fetus’ prognosis was
poor Irish laws prevented abortion. 188 Pursuant to a 1992 Supreme
Court ruling, abortion in Ireland is permitted where the fetal heartbeat
ceases, or when there is a “substantial risk” to the life of the
mother.189 During the inquest, the state coroner testified that public
hospitals, while not bound by religious dogma, may continue to
adhere to a policy stemming from a Catholic pro-life perspective.190
The public order and morality clause of Bunreacht na hEireann
protects this majority opinion because there remains a religious
influence in the population; while Ireland has been criticized for these
practices, the idea of requiring a strong majority to overhaul Catholic
abortion policies maintains a measure of stability and predictability in
the government which permits future legislative changes to be
conducted with the support of the Irish people.191
F. Changing Public Order and Morality Perceptions
In 2010, the Oireachtas encountered an issue similar to the
recent United States holding in Obergefell just prior to passage of the
Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants
Act of 2010.192 This Act gave same-sex couples greater legal rights,
187. See A, B, and C. v. Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (stating Ireland was
guilty of not providing for the human rights of the Plaintiffs); see also Douglas Dalby,
Religious Remark Confirmed in Irish Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 11, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/11/world/europe/religious-remark-confirmed-in-irishabortion-case.html?_r=0 (stating the results of the inquest found that part of the reasoning for
this denial was that “Ireland was a Catholic country”).
188. See Dalby, supra note 178 (confirming the abortion practice despite the law); see
also Failure in Basic Care of Salita Halappanavar, BBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2013)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24463106 (declaring the failings of Ms.
Halappanavar’s care).
189. Supra note 188.
190. See Dalby, supra note 178 (describing why Ms. Halappanavar died); see also
Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14 (describing the strength of Catholic Influence in
Ireland).
191. Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14. (noting how the prevalence of Catholicism
weighs on the people of Ireland); see also Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (subjecting
religious freedom to public order and morality).
192. Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act of 2010
(Ir.) (granting homosexuals more rights than they had enjoyed before)
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2010/en.act.2010.0024.pdf. Cf. Same-Sex Marriage
Referendum, supra note 6.
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but still did not grant to them all of the benefits of marriage.193 The
justification for this was the need to safeguard the privileged status
given to marriage in the Irish Constitution. 194 The dialogue of the
debate process is interesting specifically because it demonstrates the
overwhelming shifting ideas of public opinion on this issue.195
During the Oireachtas debate process the Minister for Justice
noted that “it was now time to add to the legal protections in place
against discrimination and exclusion, and to officially recognize and
affirm same-sex relationships so as to bring to an end the legacy of
prejudice and inequality.”196 The Catholic Bishop’s Conference called
for a “free vote” on the proposed bill and prepared a statement
arguing that the bill failed to “ensure special care for the institution of
marriage on which . . . the family is founded.”197 This involvement
by the Catholic Bishops Conferences was actually criticized by the
Minister for the Environment for attempting to influence the
legislative process, and was even described as “reminiscent of earlier
eras of ‘church interference.’” 198 The Attorney General of Ireland
commented that future litigation on this Act would hinge upon the
public order and morality clause of Article 44 of the Bunreacht.199

193. See Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act of
2010 (Ir.) http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2010/en.act.2010.0024.pdf. Cf. Same-Sex
Marriage Referendum, supra note 6 (making this act obsolete by completely legalizing samesex marriage).
194. See Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act of
2010 (Ir.) http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2010/en.act.2010.0024.pdf. Cf. Same-Sex
Marriage Referendum, supra note 6.
195. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 301 (describing the process in the
Oireachtas to get this passed and the special interest groups involved); see also Civil
Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act of 2010 (Ir.)
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2010/en.act.2010.0024.pdf.
196. See supra note 195.
197. See, e.g., Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14 (describing the Bishop’s call for a
free
vote);
see
also
Debate
on
the
2010
Cohabitants
Act
(2010)
http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/about/libraryresearchservice/onlinecataloguecollections/d
ocumentslaidthroughthedecades/2010s-debateonmarriageequality/ (detailing the debate).
198. See supra note 197
199. See Mullally & O’Donovan, supra note 14, at 303 (detailing the statements made
by the Attorney General); see also. Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44 (declaring religious
rights are subject to public order and morality). In fact, the issue of marriage equality was
ultimately left to the Public Order and Morality clause when the public voted by referendum,
thereby declaring what public order and morality actually was. See Same-Sex Marriage
Referendum, supra note 6.
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The Attorney General’s comment that the Act would hinge on
the public order and morality clause would prove oddly clairvoyant
as, on May 23, 2015, Ireland became the first country in the world to
recognize marriage equality by referendum; the act of such a
referendum had the direct effect of announcing where the public stood
on the issue, laying to rest any notion that marriage equality went
against notions of public order and morality. 200 The act of using a
referendum was the most tactically advantageous as it was the only
means by which “the public order and morality” could definitively be
surveyed on this issue. 201 This act most clearly illustrates the
ideological differences of the United States and Ireland vis-á-vis the
expression of religion, namely that the United States relied upon the
power and authority of the judiciary to permit the extension of marital
rights whereas the Irish allowed public moral opinion to dictate such
an extension.202
III. GOVERNMENTAL MOVEMENT TOWARDS POST-SECULAR
SOCIETIES
Current movements in the United States and Ireland are bringing
these countries—which were previously on opposing sides of the
spectrum—on convergent paths where religious free exercise meets
government.203 The Irish trend of deferring to religion and allowing
opposing parties to bring Church dogma into the court is beginning to
occur in the United States. 204 The act of following a religion is,
however, by its nature a personal right, and the Irish demonstrate a
200 . See Lisa McNally, Ireland Votes to Legalize Gay Marriage in a Historic
Referendum, NBC NEWS (May 23, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ireland-gaymarriage-referendum-count-begins-after-high-turnout-n363666 (reporting the results of the
marriage referendum); see also Same-Sex Marriage Referendum Results, IRISH TIMES (May
22, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/marriage-referendum (giving the results of
the marriage referendum).
201. See Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, supra note 6 (noting that Ireland utilized the
methods discussed in the dissenting opinions); see also Constitution of Ireland, 1937 art. 44
(subjecting Free Exercise to the requirements of public order and morality).
202. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) with Same-Sex Marriage
Referendum, supra note 6 (affording the Irish people to do precisely what both Justices Scalia
and Roberts advocated for in their dissents).
203. See supra Part II (paying particular attention to comparisons that can be drawn
between US and Irish law).
204 . See supra Part II.A (describing the substantiality requirement and the least
restrictive means test).
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better balance of religion with public opinion than the United
States.205 Irish policy generally favors free exercise, but only insofar
as it maintains public order and morality.206 This necessarily leads to
a certain amount of discrimination on the part of certain parties, but
the goal of maintaining public order is accomplished.207 Without the
government prioritizing the overall society, individuals in the United
States could begin to equate the personal liberty to practice religion
with the personal right to proselytize. 208 This encourages more
instances of discrimination and more disputes entering into the
judiciary.209
The United States’ concern over the individual practice of
religion and the ability to hold sincere religious beliefs is complicated
by the inclusion of closely held corporations as members of a
community of believers, which are granted all the rights and
protections of the individual in asserting one belief over that of
another.210 Hobby Lobby allowed the religious morals and beliefs of a
single family to dictate policy for employees, irrespective of the fact
that the employees may not be part of the same community of
believers. 211 The power this grants owners of closely-held
corporations violates the premise that “by incorporating a business, an
individual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal
responsibility for the entity’s obligations.”212

205. See supra Part I.B (describing the history of Ireland); see also Constitution of
Ireland 1937 art. 44 (noting public order and morality provisions).
206. Compare Corway v. Ind. News Ltd. [1999] 4 IR 485 (Ir.) (noting that, despite a
shift in religious ideology, there was generally not a negative effect upon the public) with
Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, supra note 6 (showing a change in policy brought about by
an overwhelming declaration on the public perceptions of same-sex marriage).
207. See id.
208. See supra Part II.A (describing the idea that people want to impose their own
morality on other’s actions).
209. See supra Part II.A.
210. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2796 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (noting the difference between a homogenous community celebrating the same
beliefs and a non-homogenous community whose only common connection may be their place
of employment); see also supra Part II.B (describing how the government can potentially
regulate conflicts between religious corporations and religious employees).
211. See supra note 210.
212. Id.
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The United States’ perceptions of religious expression have
overextended the idea of personal rights, discussed in Griswold. 213
Personal rights should be granted to protect citizens from a higher
establishment’s ability to dictate how a person lives. 214 Currently,
most governmental protections are given to religious people, which
can have the unwanted side effect of facilitating religious practices in
people who do not believe. 215 Presently, the religious beliefs of
subsets of people can dictate how the government, a corporation, or a
colleague will treat others. The protections of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 only protect citizens who are experiencing
religious discrimination by employers or potential employers. 216
Corporations are permitted to hold religious beliefs, which allows
them to object to the government or to implement policy decisions
based on that belief.217 The judiciary’s ability to deal with religious
questions is constrained by the legislature’s passage of RFRA and
RLUIPA.218
The simple solution is for Congress to actively exclude for-profit
corporations from constituting persons for purposes of religious
exercise.219 This rids owners of corporations of the ability to preach
their positions to employees with the economic weight of their
business behind them.220 This also has the effect of eliminating interreligious conflicts between the corporation and the employee. 221 In
the United States, there is still no clear consensus as to how to treat a
large organization’s religious beliefs. 222 Denying corporations the
benefit of asserting a free exercise claim would ensure they are not
unduly advantaged by basing decisions on corporate religious
213. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) with Ryan v. Att’y Gen.
[1965] IR 294 (Ir.) (discovering private rights of privacy within both the US and Irish
Constitutions).
214. Id.
215. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circumstance in which employees receive the
benefit of Title VII protections).
216. See supra Part II.B
217. Id.
218. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (describing
limitations by which the government can infringe on the free practice of religion); see also The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012) (reinforcing
the same limitations).
219. See supra Part II (comparing the United States with the Irish approach).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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declarations. 223 In Ireland, shifting notions on religion lead to an
indication that discriminatory practices grounded in a religious
majority are coming to an end. 224 Both countries must realize that
organizations unaffiliated with a recognized religion cannot assert
religious claims to the detriment of others. 225 The only means of
effectively leveling the playing field is to exclude religiously-based
regulatory practices.226
Prior to the passage of RFRA, the Sherbert test had been
successfully used to determine free exercise claims for roughly thirty
years.227 This is because the Sherbert test allowed greater discretion in
determining if a law was sufficiently narrowly tailored so as to limit a
burden on religious practice before determining if that particular
limitation was the least restrictive measure the government could
use. 228 Incorporating the “narrowly tailored” language into RFRA
would help to limit the scope of determining the point at which the
government is violating the right of free exercise.229 The current trend
of permitting a broad mandate that anything the government does
must be constructed in the least restrictive manner to any religious
practice is both an insurmountable burden and tends to encourage the
adoption of a religious practice in order to seek an exemption from an
unpopular law. 230 Doing this would allow the courts to revisit the
ideology of those judicial opinions, including Smith, to determine a
more workable standard for analyzing claims involving the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 231 The United States can
establish the use of an approach similar to that of Ireland in which
claims brought before the judiciary can be analyzed on a case-by-case
basis.232 The District Courts can further this by instituting policies and
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Compare Part II.A (discussing the issue of extending religious exemptions to large
organizations) with Part II.E (noting that the death of Savita Halapannavar was due to Catholic
influence on hospital policy).
227. See id.
228. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to
Free Exercise Claims); see also supra Part I.A.
229. See supra note 228.
230. Id.
231. See supra Part I.A (describing the Sherbert test and giving the historical
background of the RFRA).
232. See supra Part I.B (analyzing the historic approach to claims in Ireland).
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procedures calling for alternative dispute resolution methods to be
used in these cases in much the same way that the Irish make use of
methods such as alternative dispute tribunals.233
The third option is for the legislative branches of the United
States and Ireland to begin changing policies regarding the nature of
how religion is interpreted in the Constitution and in government as a
whole. 234 Both countries can learn about the advantages and
disadvantages of the other systems.235 The United States has worked
on acknowledging the religious ideology of individuals and the role
that government can play on restricting this expression.236 However,
the current methods place too much emphasis on the individual, rather
than on what works best to maintain society.237 Conversely, Ireland
pays too much attention to allowing the majority opinion to dictate
the direction of policy.238 The Irish should continue working towards
eliminating discrimination resulting from religious observance , as the
current system is unjustly weighted against members of minority
religions and citizens who seek to be unaffiliated with religion. 239
Ultimately, the United States Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment can be examined alongside Bunreacht na
hEireann’s Article 44. While both documents contain different
language, there exists enough parallels in the history, case law, and
legislation to see that the Irish and United States perspectives have
been on a convergent path towards similar post-secular
understandings of governance. 240 This would entrench religious
observance as a private right of the individual, free from
governmental interference. 241 This freedom would extend to public
displays of religious practice but only where such displays won’t be
construed to incite hatred, violence, or discrimination in others.242

233. See, e.g., supra Part II.F (discussing the tribunal of Sheeran v. Department of
Public Works).
234. See supra Part II (contrasting the US and Irish styles of governance).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra Parts I and II (discussing the similarities of the history of the United
States and Ireland).
241. See supra Parts I and II.
242. Id.
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Post-secular governance seeks to respect the religious practices
of the different parties involved in disputes. 243 It emphasizes
governance that allows individuals to express a religious belief only
insofar as it would not negatively impact the physical or mental health
of a significant portion of other people.244 Both the United States and
Ireland moving toward this common goal, and are approaching it
from opposite starting points. On the one hand, Ireland began as a
sectarian State that increasingly moves towards post-secular
governance. On the other hand, the Establishment Clause in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution has always been
interpreted so as to limit the role of religion in government.245 Despite
this, the judiciary of the United States is increasingly called upon to
evaluate claims involving substantial religious beliefs, to weigh those
beliefs in the context of how they are affected by governmental policy
and procedure, and to make a determination as to whether there is a
religious exemption to a law, or if the law itself is averse to religion.
Regardless of where on the spectrum of sectarian-secular the United
States and Ireland fall, the idea that both countries are now
considering the multicultural as well as inter- and intrareligious
effects of law and policy is an indication that these issues will
continue to remain prevalent in the near future.246
CONCLUSION
What happens to citizens when the religious free exercise rights
of one subset of the population are protected to the point where they
infringe upon another portion of the population?247 The Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”248 This term of
“free exercise” should be equated to the freedom to pursue religion,

243. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining post-secular governance).
244. Id.
245. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting the free exercise of religion).
246. See supra Part II (examining the increase in religious claims since the passage of
the RFRA in 1993).
247. See supra Part II
248. See U.S. CONST. amend I (upholding the free exercise of religion).
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the freedom to pursue different religions, and the freedom to not
pursue religion.249
Conversely, Bunreacht na hEireann grants religious freedom
subject to the public order and morality. 250 Through the legislative
process, alternative dispute resolution methods, and case law, the Irish
understanding on religious rights indicates that there must be an
overwhelming societal support on an issue in order to have religious
ideologies endorsed by the state. 251 Religion is a personal matter,
however, and Ireland acknowledges its influence on personal
decision-making. The public order and morality requirements help to
ensure that no policy is adopted that is disagreed upon by the vast
majority of the population.252
This Comment addresses a convergence of two different
governing bodies towards a similar concept of post-secularism. Postsecularism is a way to both respect and honor a religious belief, while
also maintaining governmental separation from such beliefs. 253 By
doing so, governments can see to the needs of all people residing in
their countries rather than give preference to certain religious
organizations and belief systems.254

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See supra Part II (comparing the United States with the Irish Approach).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

